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Lesson Objectives
 Define major Command and Service Module 
(CSM) design considerations
 List Command Module (CM) RCS failures and 
lessons learned
Li t S i M d l (SM) RCS f il d s  erv ce o u e   a ures an  
lessons learned
For more information about CSM RCS system 
please see  
http://modspops.jsc.nasa.gov/mod/DA4/CxTraining/Apollo/Apollo%20Wiki/CSM%20R
eaction%20Control%20System%20(RCS).aspx
CSM RCS Overview
CSM Design Considerations
CM Design Considerations
SM Design Considerations
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CM Failures and Lessons Learned
CM Propellant Isolation Valves
 Apollo 7 - damaged 
bellows
 Apollo 10 ruptured  -  
oxidizer burst 
diaphragm
 Apollo 12 - damaged 
bellows
 Apollo 13 fuel valve  -   
coil miswiring
CM Propellant Isolation Valve Lessons Learned
 Proper procedures
 Caution notes and leak 
checks
 Resistance checks
Isolation Valve
CM Helium Manifold
 Anomaly: Helium manifold pressure drop 
discovered before launch of Apollo 10;  no 
measurable leak was found   
 Conclusion: Fuel leg helium manifold was 
indeed leaking but at an acceptable rate for the 
mission
 Solution: Pressurized system to 100psi 30 days 
prior to launch to insure detection of any leak        
CM Automatic Coil
 Anomaly: Faulty terminal 
board sending erratic firing 
signals through automatic 
coils
 Conclusion: Two loose pins    
causing intermittent 
continuity to coils  
¾ Found in all pre November   -  
1967 terminal boards
S l ti N ti o u on: o correc ons 
made since terminal boards 
did not affect circuits that 
j di d
Terminal board schematic for minus-
yaw engine
eopar ze  crew
CM Propellant Dump
 Apollo 15 - Deflated 
parachute due to CM 
RCS depletion firing
¾ Correction: 
Procedures changed 
to allow propellant to 
remain onboard at 
landing
 Apollo 16 – Small 
burn holes caused by 
yaw engine firings
¾ Tests determined  
maximum pressure 
and planned for on-
the-water operation 
of the system if 
required
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SM RCS Failures and Lessons Learned
SM Isolation Valves
 Apollo 9 - Valves shocked closed
 Apollo 11 - Valves closed during CSM separation from 
S IVB-
 Apollo 13 – Valves closed due to oxygen tank anomaly
 Apollo 15 - Degaussed magnets due to reversed polarity       

SM Isolation Valve Lessons Learned
 Apollo Operations Handbook changed to insure 
that the crew would check isolation valves after 
ti d th t l dsepara on an  reopen any a  c ose
 A test was performed on all post-Apollo 15 
flights to verify acceptable valve latching forces      
SM Manifold
 Apollo 12: Helium manifold pressure transducer      
malfunction
 Apollo 14: Oxidizer manifold pressure out of       
nominal limits
Summary
9 Define major Command and Service Module 
(CSM) design considerations
9 List Command Module (CM) RCS failures and 
lessons learned
Li t S i M d l (SM) RCS f il d9 s  erv ce o u e   a ures an  
lessons learned
For more information about CSM RCS system 
please see  
http://modspops.jsc.nasa.gov/mod/DA4/CxTraining/Apollo/Apollo%20Wiki/CSM%20R
eaction%20Control%20System%20(RCS).aspx
References
 Apollo Mission Reports 6-17
 Apollo Experience Report – Command and 
Service Module Reaction Control Systems
Use References link below for more information
